Mercer Law Review
Volume 56
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 9

12-2004

Domestic Relations
Barry B. McGough
Gregory R. Miller

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
McGough, Barry B. and Miller, Gregory R. (2004) "Domestic Relations," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 56: No. 1,
Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol56/iss1/9

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
and
Gregory IL Miller**
Of the domestic relations appellate cases decided during this survey
period,1 twenty-three are discussed below. Georgia law requires that
appeals of domestic relations cases occur through the discretionary
application process.2 A party wanting to appeal an order in a domestic
relations case must first file an application to obtain the permission of
the appropriate appellate court to file an appeal.3 As part of a pilot
project, the Georgia Supreme Court began accepting all "non-frivolous"
applications filed in domestic relations cases during the 2003 calendar
year.4 The supreme court extended the pilot project for the 2004
calendar year; however, the supreme court limited the pilot project to
applications filed from divorce cases.5 The pilot project does not include
cases that would be appealed to the court of appeals first,6 writs of
* Partner in the firm, McGough, Huddleston & Medori, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B., 1966). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of McGough, Huddleston & Medori, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.B.A., 1989); Georgia State University (J.D., 1994). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. This survey chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 2003 to May 31, 2004.
2. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2) (Supp. 2004).
3. Id. § 5-6-35(b).
4. See Wright v. Wright, 277 Ga. 133, 587 S.E.2d 600 (2003). Under the pilot project,
all divorce and alimony discretionary applications filed with the Georgia Supreme Court
on or after January 6, 2003 will be automatically granted unless the application is found
to be frivolous by a majority vote of the court.
5. The supreme court had been accepting applications for other matters, e.g., the
discretionary application in the contempt and child support modification case. Moccia v.
Moccia, 277 Ga. 571, 592 S.E.2d 664 (2004) (filed and accepted under the pilot project in
2003).
6. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 2 (listing appeals for which the supreme court has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction, including any questions on the constitutionality of a
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The domestic relations bar
certiorari,7 or interlocutory appeals.8
remains hopeful that the pilot project will be extended again for the
2005 calendar year or made permanent; however, no decision has been
announced as of yet. The pilot project has enabled courts to address a
variety of domestic relations issues that will benefit the domestic
relations bar and future litigants.
I.

DIVORCE: JURISDICTION

The supreme court twice addressed the application of Georgia's LongArm Statute.9 In Walters v. Walters,0 the parties were married in
Denmark and lived abroad during much of their marriage due to the
husband's military service. When they returned to the United States,
they set up a matrimonial domicile in Georgia. When the parties
separated, the husband moved to Florida. After several years the wife
filed for divorce in Georgia."
Although the trial court granted the husband's motion to dismiss,
based on lack of jurisdiction, the supreme court reversed.12 Section 910-91 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") "allows a
Georgia court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in the
same manner as if he were a resident of the state if certain requireSpecifically, the Long-Arm Statute allows for
ments are met." 3
jurisdiction to be exercised in divorce cases when either the nonresident
spouse maintains a matrimonial domicile in Georgia at the time the
action was filed or when the nonresident spouse resided in Georgia prior
to the action being filed. 4 The nonresident must also have "minimum
contacts" with the state to satisfy the due process rights of the nonresident. 5 The court determined that when the husband participated in
establishing and maintaining a marital residence in Georgia, he

statute); GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 3 (listing appeals for which the supreme court has
general appellate jurisdiction including judgments for alimony and divorce); GA. CONST.
art. VI, § 5, para. 3 (vesting the court of appeals with jurisdiction in those appellate cases
not reserved to the supreme court or other courts).
7. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-15 (1995).
8. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (Supp. 2004).
9. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (Supp. 2004).
10. 277 Ga. 221, 586 S.E.2d 663 (2003).
11. Id. at 221-23, 586 S.E.2d at 663-64.
12. Id. at 221, 586 S.E.2d at 633.
13. Id. at 223, 586 S.E.2d at 665 (quoting Strickland v. Strickland, 272 Ga. 855, 856-57,
534 S.E.2d 74, 75 (2000)).
14. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(5) (Supp. 2004).
15. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 453, 330 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
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Similarly, in Cooke v. Cooke,'" the supreme court held that the trial
court erroneously dismissed a divorce action based on the wife's
relocation to England.' 9 The parties, an Irish husband, an English
wife, and their six children moved to Georgia in 1992. The wife returned
to England with the children in 1999; however, the husband remained
in Georgia. The parties continued to file joint tax returns, claiming to
be full-time Georgia residents. In 2003 the husband filed for divorce in
Georgia. The wife moved to dismiss the Georgia action based on lack of
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and forum non conveniens. The
trial court granted the wife's motion on the two former counts, but the
trial court did not address the latter.2 °
In reversing, the supreme court held that the maintenance of the
matrimonial domicile in Georgia satisfied Georgia's Long-Arm Statute. 21 The fact that the Georgia residence was the last residence where
the parties lived together as a family unit, provided the minimum
22
contacts necessary to satisfy any due process concerns.
II.

DIVORCE: PROCEDURE

The supreme court addressed several issues concerning trial procedure
in family law cases. First, in Blaylock v. Blaylock,23 the court considered whether one party has a right to a jury trial when the other party
has not yet filed defensive pleadings.2 4 O.C.G.A. section 19-5-1(a)
provides that a jury trial is authorized when "'an issuable defense is
filed as provided by law and a jury is demanded in writing ... on or

16. Walters, 277 Ga. at 224, 586 S.E.2d at 665.
17. Id.
18. 277 Ga. 731, 594 S.E.2d 370 (2004).
19. Id. at 731, 594 S.E.2d at 373.
20. Id. at 731-32, 594 S.E.2d at 371. Even though O.C.G.A. section 19-9-67 allows a
trial court to decline jurisdiction of custody-related issues based on forum non conveniens,
it does not appear that the wife was relying on the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-67 (2004). Under O.C.G.A. section 19-9-61, England
would be the children's home state, and under O.C.G.A. section 19-9-44, Georgia should
have deferred jurisdiction to the appropriate court in England. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-44 (2004).
21. Cooke, 277 Ga. at 733, 594 S.E.2d at 371-72.
22. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 372.
23. 277 Ga. 56, 586 S.E.2d 650 (2003).
24. Id. at 56, 586 S.E.2d at 650.
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before the call of the case [to] trial ... ,"2' Noting that a defendant in
a divorce case is not required to file a formal answer and default
judgments cannot be entered in divorce cases, the supreme court held
that an issuable defense can be filed in documents other than an
answer.26 In this case the wife's demand for a jury trial was denied by
the trial court because the husband had not filed an answer. The
husband did participate in the preparation of a pre-trial order, wherein
he admitted that the wife was entitled to receive child support and an
equitable division of the property; however, he disagreed with the
amount of child support and the actual division of assets being requested
Even when the defense is a partial one, as in this case,
by the wife.
the supreme court held that either party has a substantive right to
demand a jury trial.28
When there are factual issues to be determined, the supreme court
also held that trial courts cannot reject a party's request to make a
In Wilson v. Wilson,3 °
closing argument, even during a bench trial.'
the wife's attorney made a request to make a closing argument; however,
the judge denied the request.3 ' The supreme court recognized that
some states allow arguments as an absolute right,32 while other states
give the trial judge discretion whether to allow closing arguments in a
bench trial.33 The supreme court decided, however, to follow a more
The supreme court held that a trial court
intermediate approach.'
may not deny a party the right to make a closing argument; however, a
trial court may limit the argument in time and content.35
III.

CHILD CUSTODY

The supreme court was presented with an unusual set of facts in
6
Although the wife was two months pregnant when
Baker v. Baker."

25. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-5-1(a) (2004)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 57, 586 S.E.2d at 651.
28. Id.
29. Wilson v. Wilson, 277 Ga. 801, 803-04, 596 S.E.2d 392, 394 (2004).
30. 277 Ga. 801, 596 S.E.2d 392 (2004).
31. Id. at 801, 596 S.E.2d at 393.
32. Id. at 802, 596 S.E.2d at 393. See Pettry v. Pettry, 706 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998); Nestor v. George, 46 A.2d 469 (Pa. 1946).
33. Wilson, 277 Ga. at 802, 596 S.E.2d at 393. See Korbelik v. Staschke, 596 N.E.2d
805, 808 (I1. App. Ct. 1992).
34. Wilson, 277 Ga. at 802,596 S.E.2d at 393. See In re Emileigh F., 724 A-2d 639 (Md.
1999); Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97, 101 (N.D. 1977).
35. Wilson, 277 Ga. at 802, 596 S.E.2d at 393.
36. 276 Ga. 778, 582 S.E.2d 102 (2003).
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the parties met, they married prior to the child's birth. The biological
father was incarcerated and would not be released until 2011. The
husband provided emotional and financial support to the wife throughout the pregnancy. The husband was listed as the child's father on the
birth certificate. When the husband filed for divorce, he sought custody
of the child."
Although a child born during a marriage is presumed to be the child
of the husband, 8 the presumption can be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence. 9 The wife challenged the husband's request for
custody, stating that the husband was not the biological father. When
the biological father intervened, the trial court ordered DNA testing,
which confirmed that the husband was not the biological father. The
trial court indicated that the child's best interests would be served by
the husband remaining as the child's father; however, the wife had
successfully rebutted the presumption of paternity.4'
In a four-to-three decision, the supreme court reversed the trial court,
holding that the trial court was required to find that the presumption of
parentage was not only rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, but
also that the rebuttal was in the child's best interests.4 ' The dissent
claimed the majority opinion overstepped judicial authority by allowing
trial courts to utilize the "best interests of the child standard" to
determine whether the trial courts should follow statutory procedures
passed by the legislature and signed into law by the governor.42
IV. CHILD CUSTODY: NON-PARENTS
Cases between parents and grandparents continued to reach the
appellate courts. In Jones v. Burks,' the court of appeals reversed an
award of custody to the maternal grandmother in an action contested by
the children's father." Under O.C.G.A. section 19-7-1(b. 1), 45 custody
may be awarded to a close relative of the children if clear and convincing
evidence shows that parental custody would harm the children
physically or emotionally, and custody by the non-parent would promote

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
(2001).
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 778-79, 582 S.E.2d at 102-03.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-20(a) (2004); O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1(6) (2004).
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-20(b).
Baker, 276 Ga. at 779, 582 S.E.2d at 103.
Id. at 780, 582 S.E.2d at 104; see also Davis v. LaBrec, 274 Ga. 5, 549 S.E.2d 76
Baker, 276 Ga. at 784, 582 S.E.2d at 106 (Benham, J., dissenting).
267 Ga. App. 390, 599 S.E.2d 322 (2004).
Id. at 392, 599 S.E.2d at 324.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (2004).
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the children's health, welfare, and happiness.4" In awarding custody
to the maternal grandmother, the trial court failed to include any
written findings to support its decision.47 The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for findings consistent with the requireSimilarly, in Rainey v.
ments of O.C.G.A. section 19-7-1(b.1).4
Lange,49 the court of appeals reversed an award of visitation, under
O.C.G.A. section 19-7-3,'o to the maternal grandparents when written
findings of fact were not included in the trial court's order."1
V.

CHILD CUSTODY: MODIFICATION

A divided supreme court made new law in the area of relocation by
reversing established case law from the court of appeals. In Bodne v.
Bodne,52 the supreme court considered whether a primary custodian's
move may be considered a basis for a custody modification.53 The court
of appeals had previously ruled that a custodial parent's relocation
affected visitation rights; however, a move alone was not a change of
M
circumstances warranting a change of custody."
In Bodne the father was awarded primary custody when the parties
divorced. The father, remarried and planning to move to Alabama, filed
an action to modify the mother's visitation rights. The mother filed a
counterclaim for custody. The trial court heard evidence that supported
the mother's claim that the proposed relocation would not be in the
children's best interests, and the trial judge awarded custody to the
mother. The father appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the
trial court's decision based on the established precedent.55

46. Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 599, 544 S.E.2d 99, 100 (2001).
47. Jones, 267 Ga. App. at 392, 599 S.E.2d at 324.
48. Id.
49. 261 Ga. App. 491, 583 S.E.2d 163 (2003).
50. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (2004).
51. Rainey, 261 Ga. App. at 491-92, 583 S.E.2d at 164. O.C.G.A. section 19-7-3(c)
expressly requires written findings of fact.
52. 277 Ga. 445, 588 S.E.2d 728 (2003).
53. Id. at 446, 588 S.E.2d at 729.
54. Id. at 446-47, 588 S.E.2d at 729 (citing Ormandy v. Odom, 217 Ga. App. 780, 459
S.E.2d 439 (1995)); see also Helm v. Graham, 249 Ga. App. 126, 547 S.E.2d 343 (2001);
Daniel v. Daniel, 250 Ga. App. 482, 552 S.E.2d 479 (2001); Lewis v. Lewis, 252 Ga. App.
539,557 S.E.2d 40 (2001); Ofchus v. Isom, 239 Ga. App. 738,521 S.E.2d 871 (1999); Mahan
v. McRae, 241 Ga. App. 109, 522 S.E.2d 772 (1999); Holt v. Leiter, 232 Ga. App. 376, 501
S.E.2d 879 (1998); Grubbs v. Dowse, 226 Ga. App. 763, 177 S.E.2d 237 (1970); Mercer v.
Foster, 210 Ga. App. 546, 81 S.E.2d 458 (1954).
55. Bodne, 277 Ga. at 445, 588 S.E.2d at 728-29.
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The supreme court granted certiorari in the case.5" The supreme
court reversed the court of appeals because it determined a bright line
test was inapplicable.57 The court reasoned that in a custody modification case, there can be no presumption that a moving parent will always
retain custody or always lose custody. 8 Likewise, there can be no
presumption that the primary custodian is entitled to retain custody.59
The court must examine the evidence in each case, determine if a
significant change has occurred affecting the children's welfare, and, if
so, determine whether a change of custody is in the best interests of the
children. ° The supreme court concluded that the trial court utilized
the correct standard.6 1
The court of appeals was also called upon to decide whether certain
facts authorized a modification of child custody. 2 In Durham v.
Gipson," the mother sought custody of the parties' two daughters that
had been residing with the father. The older daughter was over the age
of fourteen and had elected to live with the mother. The younger
daughter was ten, and there was conflicting evidence about her desires.
The trial court awarded custody of the older daughter to the mother;
however, the trial court found that there was no basis to change custody
of the younger daughter.'
Georgia law allows for children over the age of fourteen to elect the
parent with whom they will reside, and the child's election is binding
unless the selected parent is determined to be unfit.65 Elections made
by children between the ages of eleven and fourteen must be considered
by trial courts; however, the elections are not binding.6" Furthermore,
elections made by children between the ages of eleven and fourteen are
a change in circumstances warranting a
not, in and of themselves,
67
modification of custody.
The court of appeals clearly stated that the custody change of one
child was a change of conditions that would warrant changing the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 446, 588 S.E.2d at 729.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447, 588 S.E.2d at 729.
Id. at 446, 588 S.E.2d at 729.
Id. at 447, 588 S.E.2d at 729.
Durham v. Gipson, 261 Ga. App. 602, 605, 583 S.E.2d 254, 257 (2003).
261 Ga. App. 602, 583 S.E.2d 254 (2003).
Id. at 602-05, 583 S.E.2d at 255-57.
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(a)(3)(A) (2004); O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(4) (2004).
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(a)(3)(B) (2004); O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(4.1) (2004).
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(a)(3)(C) (2004).

228

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

custody of other siblings." The appellate court emphasized the "best
interests of the child" standard and the emotional toll of separating
siblings as important considerations in promoting the child's welfare.69

VI.

CHILD SUPPORT: GUIDELINES

Georgia's Child Support Guidelines ("Guidelines")7 ° continued to
withstand appellate scrutiny. The first constitutional challenge to the
Guidelines to reach the appellate court was the 2003 case of Georgia
Department of Human Resources ("DHR") v. Sweat."' The supreme
court upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines despite allegations
that the Guidelines violated substantive due process, equal protection,
privacy, and illegal taking laws.72 The mother applied for a writ of
certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court; however, the writ was
3
denied.1
In Ward v. McFall,7 4 the Guidelines were challenged under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.7 ' To qualify for
federal funds from the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program, Georgia had to include written guidelines in its "state plan" for
the calculation of child support, and procedures to review the guidelines
at least once every four years.7 6 Georgia instituted its Guidelines;
however, the review of the Guidelines did not meet all of the requirements set forth by the federal statute. v The trial court found that
Georgia's failure to comply with the federal mandates invalidated the
Guidelines under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 7s
The supreme court disagreed.7 ' A state's domestic relations laws will
not be overridden by federal statutes unless the state statute does
"major damage to 'clear and substantial' federal interests." ° After

68. Durham, 261 Ga. App. at 605-06, 583 S.E.2d at 257 (citing Westmoreland v.
Westmoreland, 243 Ga. 77, 252 S.E.2d 496 (1979); Lamb v. Lamb, 230 Ga. 532, 198 S.E.2d
171 (1973)).
69. Id. at 606, 583 S.E.2d at 257.
70. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (2004).
71. 276 Ga. 627, 580 S.E.2d 206 (2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 432 (2003).
72. Id. at 627, 580 S.E.2d at 209.
73. Sweat v. Georgia Dep't of Human Servs., 124 S. Ct. 432 (2003).
74. 277 Ga. 649, 593 S.E.2d 340 (2004). The supreme court entered a second opinion,
Keck v. Harris,277 Ga. 667, 594 S.E.2d 367 (2004), which affirmed a trial court's rejection
of the same Supremacy Clause arguments set forth in Ward.
75. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
76. Ward, 277 Ga. at 650, 593 S.E.2d at 341 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(D) (2004)).
77. Id. at 651, 593 S.E.2d at 341 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 667 (2000).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 653, 593 S.E.2d at 343.
80. Id. at 652, 593 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987)).
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considering the federal interest in having states impose and enforce child
support orders against noncustodial parents, the supreme court held that
any failure by Georgia to strictly adhere to the review process did not do
major damage to the federal interest.8 '
The appellate courts continued to demand technical compliance with
the Guidelines.8" In Southerland v. Southerland,' the supreme court
remanded the case back to the trial court because the child support
judgment recited the father's income but not the mother's income.'
The court determined the Guidelines required written findings of each
party's income.8" In Todd v. Todd,88 the court of appeals remanded
a child support modification case in which the trial court awarded child
support in excess of the Guidelines without enumerating the findings
that supported the departure.87 In Esser v. Esser,8 the supreme court
held that the trial court erred in adopting the parties' agreement
without including the written findings required by the Guidelines, which
included the parties' incomes, calculation of the range of child support
required under the Guidelines, and findings of any special circumstances.89 The case was remanded for a new child support award to be
entered. 90
In Eleazer v. Eleazer,9' the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
child support order when the order contained the requisite findings to
support a deviation from the Guidelines. 92 At the parties' original trial,
the trial judge awarded custody of the parties' two children to the
mother and ordered the father to pay $2500 per month for the children
as child support.9 The father appealed to the supreme court, which
concluded that the child support order did not include the findings
required by the Guidelines.' On remand before a different judge, the
trial court granted a new trial on all issues.95 The new trial court
ordered the father to pay $1,562.50 per month as child support, even
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id., 593 S.E.2d at 342-43.
Southerland v. Southerland, 278 Ga. 188, 598 S.E.2d 442 (2004).
278 Ga. 188, 598 S.E.2d 442 (2004).
Id. at 189, 598 S.E.2d at 444.
Id. See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(a) (2004).
267 Ga. App. 243, 599 S.E.2d 236 (2004).
Id. at 244, 599 S.E.2d at 237.
277 Ga. 97, 586 S.E.2d 627 (2003).
Id. at 99, 586 S.E.2d at 629.
Id.
277 Ga. 821, 596 S.E.2d 577 (2004).
Id. at 823, 596 S.E.2d at 578.
Eleazer v. Eleazer, 275 Ga. 482, 569 S.E.2d 521 (2002).
Id. at 483, 569 S.E.2d at 522.
Eleazer, 277 Ga. at 822 n.1, 596 S.E.2d at 577 n.1.
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though the father's income was $118,560 per year and a middleGuidelines amount would be $2495 per month. 6 The supreme court
held that the new trial court was within its discretion in lowering the
child support based on the following factors: (1) the father's obligation
to the support of another child; (2) the husband's income in excess of
$75,000 per year; (3) the father's obligation to pay for healthcare
premiums for the children and one-half of the uninsured expenses; and
(4) the extraordinary travel expenses to facilitate visitation. 7
VII.

CHILD SUPPORT: ENFORCEMENT

In the following two cases, both courts focused on the powers of the
trial court to enforce child support orders. In Collins v. Billow,9" the
supreme court emphasized that trial courts are not authorized to modify
child support amounts in the context of a contempt case.99 In Collins
when the parties divorced in 1996, the father was awarded custody and
the mother was required to pay child support in the amount of $115 per
week or twenty-three percent of her annual income, whichever was
greater. The father filed a contempt action, and in 1998 the trial court
entered an order that increased the child support to $140 per week. The
father filed a second contempt action claiming that because twenty-three
percent of the mother's income equaled an amount greater than $140 per
week, the mother was behind in child support. The mother contended
that the 1998 order required only a fiat amount of $140 per week, which
she had paid."° The supreme court noted that the trial court was not
authorized to modify the child support in 1998; however, the order was
not appealed by either party, and too much time had elapsed to file a
motion to set aside the order. 10 ' The order, therefore, was enforceable. °2 The supreme court agreed that the 1998 order increased the
child support to $140 per week and did not reference or include the
earlier automatic increases from the divorce decree.'
In Dial v. Adkins,1°4 the court of appeals allowed the trial court to
enter an order awarding interest on a child support arrearage in an

96. Id. at 822-23, 596 S.E.2d at 577.
97. Id., 596 S.E.2d at 578.
98. 277 Ga. 604, 592 S.E.2d 843 (2004).
99. Id. at 605, 592 S.E.2d at 845 (citing Harper v. Smith, 261 Ga. 286, 404 S.E.2d 120
(1991)).
100. Id. at 604, 592 S.E.2d at 844.
101. Id. at 605-06, 592 S.E.2d at 845 (referencing the three year statute of limitations
for filing a motion to set aside under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60).

102. Id. at 606, 592 S.E.2d at 845.
103. Id.
104.

265 Ga. App. 650, 595 S.E.2d 332 (2004).
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action separate from the contempt case that determined the arrearage. 1" 5 After the parties divorced in Tennessee, the mother moved to
Georgia and initiated an action to hold the father in contempt for failing
to comply with their child support order. The father was ordered to
purge himself of the contempt by issuing a payment of $30,000 by a
certain date, followed by periodic payments of the balance. The wife
later filed a separate action, under O.C.G.A. section 7-4-12.1,°6
seeking interest on the child support arrearage and was awarded
$38,329.35 in interest. On appeal the father claimed that the action for
interest was barred by res judicata as the claim for interest could have
been put in issue during the contempt case. 107 The court of appeals,
however, held that "the doctrine of resjudicata is less strictly applied in
divorce and alimony cases, including cases dealing with child support
issues."'0 8 Because the issue of interest was not contested in the
earlier case, the mother was entitled to pursue interest in a separate
action. "
VIII.

CHILD SUPPORT:

MODIFICATION

The supreme court decided two cases concerning the right to have
child support orders modified. In Staffon v. Staffon,"' the supreme
court held that the obligor's incarceration cannot serve as a basis for
modifying child support."' The court reasoned that the incarcerated
parent is liable for the consequences of his voluntary acts including the
incarceration and the inability to maintain employment." 2 Georgia

105. Id. at 652, 595 S.E.2d at 334.
106. O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12.1 (2004). The statutory interest rate is twelve percent per
annum for child support payments that are more than thirty days late. Id.
107. Dial, 265 Ga. App. at 650-51, 595 S.E.2d at 333-34. The opinion does not address,
and, therefore, the father was not allowed to raise the compulsory counterclaim provision
of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-13(a), which states:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13 (Supp. 2004).
108. Dial, 265 Ga. App. at 651-52, 595 S.E.2d at 334 (citing Brookins v. Brookins, 257
Ga. 205, 207-08, 357 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1987)). See Bailey v. Hall, 266 Ga. App. 222, 599
S.E.2d 226 (2004) (refusing to apply res judicata in a legitimation case).
109. Dial, 265 Ga. App. at 652, 595 S.E.2d at 334.
110. 277 Ga. 179, 587 S.E.2d 630 (2003).
111. Id. at 182, 587 S.E.2d at 633.
112. Id. at 180, 587 S.E.2d at 632 (quoting Chandler v. Cochran, 247 Ga. 184, 187,275
S.E.2d 23, 27 (1981)).
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courts have applied similar reasoning in actions to terminate parental
rights of an incarcerated parent when the incarcerated individual had
not been involved in the child's life or had not contributed financially to
the child's care.13 In an analogous situation, a parent obligated to pay
child support who voluntarily gave up his career to enter the ministry
at much less pay was deemed not entitled to a modification of child
support. 114
In Moccia v. Moccia," 5 the supreme court held that when the
original child support amount was based on the obligor's earning
capacity, a downward modification cannot be granted without a showing
that the earning capacity has diminished.1 6 The father's child support
award was based on his earning capacity at the time of the divorce.
When the father sought to modify his child support in a later action, the
trial court determined that the father had failed to produce any evidence
that he had tried to find employment commiserate with his abilities.
The trial court further found that the father had failed to show a
decrease in his income, due to discrepancies between the father's
testimony and the evidence presented at trial." ' In affirming the trial
court, the supreme court held that "[t]he trial court correctly held [the
father] to the standard of proof established by OCGA § 19-6-19(a),
him to show a reduction in his financial status and inrequiring
8
come.""1
IX.

ATTORNEY FEES

Attorney fees awards continue to be reversed when trial courts fail to
articulate the basis for the award and make findings of fact to support
the award. In Reese v. Grant,"9 the former husband filed a contempt
action against the former wife. Although the trial court did not find the
former wife in contempt, the trial court did order her to pay the former
husband's attorney fees. 1 20 In a contempt case, the trial court is
authorized to award attorney fees under two statutes. First, under
O.C.G.A. section 19-6-2,121 the trial court may award attorney fees to

113. See, e.g., In re M.C.L., 251 Ga. App. 132, 553 S.E.2d 647 (2001); In re A.T.H., 248
Ga. App. 570, 547 S.E.2d 299 (2001).
114. Stiltz v. Stiltz, 236 Ga. 308, 310-11, 223 S.E.2d 689, 691 (1976).
115. 277 Ga. 571, 592 S.E.2d 664 (2004).
116. Id. at 571, 592 S.E.2d at 665.
117. Id. at 571-72, 592 S.E.2d at 665.

118. Id. at 572, 592 S.E.2d at 665.
119. 277 Ga. 799, 596 S.E.2d 139 (2004).
120. Id. at 799, 596 S.E.2d at 140.
121.

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1) (2004).
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either party; however, the trial court must include findings of fact
concerning the parties' relative financial positions." Second, the trial
court could award attorney fees for frivolous litigation under O.C.G.A.
section 9-15-14,1" but the trial court must include findings of fact
warranting the award.12 In Reese the trial court awarded attorney
fees without stating the statutory basis or the findings of fact necessary
to support the award; therefore, the case was remanded.'2 5 In Moon
v. Moon, 2 6 the supreme court employed the same analysis and remanded the attorney fees award made in a divorce case.'27
X.

LEGITIMATION

1

In Bailey v. Hall, " the court of appeals held that when a trial court
denies a putative father's petition for legitimation, the putative father
is not prevented from filing another legitimation action when circumstances have changed since the prior action.' 2 9 Since the trial court
denied the legitimation petition in 1997, the father had established a
history of paying child support, expressed a desire for visitation, and
established a stable family life. The mother, on the other hand, had
gotten divorced, and her husband never attempted to adopt the child.
The trial court granted the mother's motion to dismiss based on the
doctrine of res judicata. a0 In reversing, the court of appeals stated
that although the cause of action and the parties were the same, res
judicata did not prevent courts from reexamining cases when the facts
have changed. 3' The case was remanded to the trial court for a
by the father warranted
determination of whether the new facts 1alleged
32
a reevaluation of the legitimation case.
XI.

MARITAL TORTS

s

In Gates v. Gates,"' the supreme court held that interspousal tort
immunity applies to cases when the tort occurred prior to the marriage,

122. Id.
123. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (Supp. 2004).
124. Cotting v. Cotting, 261 Ga. App. 370, 371, 582 S.E.2d 527, 529 (2003).
125. 277 Ga. at 799, 596 S.E.2d at 140.
126. 277 Ga. 375, 589 S.E.2d 76 (2003).
127. Id. at 379, 589 S.E.2d at 81.
128. 267 Ga. App. 222, 599 S.E.2d 226 (2004).
129. Id. at 222-23, 599 S.E.2d at 227.
130. Id. at 222, 599 S.E.2d at 226-27.
131. Id. at 223, 599 S.E.2d at 227 (citing Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381, 26 S.E.2d
778 (1943)).
132. Id. at 222-23, 599 S.E.2d at 227.
133. 277 Ga. 175, 587 S.E.2d 32 (2003).
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but the tort case was filed in conjunction with the divorce.' 3' Interspousal immunity bars spouses from suing one another;135 however,
there is an exception when, at the time of the injury or the discovery of
the injury, there is no longer any marital harmony to preserve. 36 In
Gates, prior to the marriage, the parties were involved in a motorcycle
accident. After a year of marriage, the parties separated and the wife
filed for divorce, and included a tort claim for injuries resulting from the
motorcycle accident. The husband's motion for summary judgment was
denied by the trial court, which found that there was a factual issue to
be determined, i.e., whether there was marital harmony to preserve.' 37
The supreme court held that the exception to interspousal immunity did
not apply when the wife, knowing of the injuries, chose to marry the
husband, since at some point after the injury, there was marital
harmony to preserve."
XII.

CONCLUSION

There were significantly more decisions rendered by the appellate
courts during this survey period than any in the recent past, largely due
to the continuation of the supreme court's pilot project. Long established
precedent was reversed concerning child custody modifications.
Constitutional challenges to the child support guidelines were rejected
and explained. The appellate courts reversed orders for failing to make
the requisite findings of fact. With clear guidance from the appellate
courts, trial judges will be able to make better decisions, domestic
relations attorneys will be better able to advise and represent their
clients, and clients will be better able to understand and anticipate the
issues that will arise during their court cases. Hopefully, the pilot
project will be extended, or made permanent, and perhaps the court of
appeals will institute a similar project.

134. Id. at 178-79, 587 S.E.2d at 35.
135. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8 (2004).
136. Gates, 277 Ga. at 178, 587 S.E.2d at 35 (citing Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387,388,
313 S.E.2d 88 (1984)).
137. Id. at 175, 587 S.E.2d at 33.
138. Id. at 178, 587 S.E.2d at 35. See also Robeson v. Int'l Indemn. Co., 248 Ga. 306,
282 S.E.2d 896 (1981).

